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Abstract	  
This paper examines the role of coherence as a source of epistemic justification, 
particularly the argument that all beliefs must cohere within one’s ‘web of belief’, aka 
confirmational holism. Confirmational holism runs across a potentially devastating 
argument that a more coherent set of beliefs resulting from the addition of a belief to 
a less coherent set of beliefs is less likely to be true than the less coherent set of 
beliefs. I propose confirmational chorism (CC) to avoid this troubling outcome. CC 
posits that coherence adds epistemic justification by limited, logically consistent sets 
of beliefs exhibiting a satisficing degree of strength, inferential and explanatory 
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connection. Limited coherence may resolve the above argument, but raises the need 
for another kind of justification: coordination (integration across sets of beliefs). Belief 
coordination requires suppressing some beliefs and communicating other beliefs to 
ensure convergence on the right action for performance success. Thus, a belief in 
any particular context is justified not just because it is reliably formed and coherent, 
but also because of how it is coordinated between local and holistic goals.  
Introduction	  
 
Epistemic justification stems foundationally from many sources including perception, 
testimony and memory. Standing in traditional opposition to foundationalism is 
coherentism. Coherentists argue that justification must stem from internal properties 
between beliefs such as logical consistency or explanatory success. Most 
philosophers defend a view between these extremes. Arguing that coherence by 
itself is insufficient as a source of justification and coherence must occur across all of 
one’s beliefs considered holistically, aka the web of belief; a thesis known as 
‘confirmational holism’.  
 
Yet, conformational holism runs across a potentially devastating argument by Peter 
Klein and Ted Warfield (1994) that suggests that a more coherent set of beliefs 
resulting from the addition of a belief to a less coherent set of beliefs is less likely to 
be true than the less coherent set of beliefs. It runs as follows: 
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(P1) Any consistent set of beliefs, B, is more likely to be true than any set, B*, 
which contains all members of B and at least one additional belief, so long as 
at least one additional belief in B* has neither an objective probability of 1 nor 
is entailed by B. 
(P2) One strategy for converting a less coherent set of beliefs into a more 
coherent set of beliefs is to add a belief (to the less coherent set) which has 
neither an objective probability of 1 nor is entailed by the less coherent set of 
beliefs. 
(C) a more coherent set of beliefs resulting from the addition of a belief to a 
less coherent set of beliefs is less likely to be true than the less coherent set 
of beliefs (Klein & Warfield, 1994, p. 130). 
 
KW defend P2 by claiming that a set of beliefs can be rendered more coherent in two 
basic ways: 
(a) the Subtraction Strategy in which a belief (and perhaps with it many more) 
is subtracted from a less coherent set, thereby rendering it more coherent; 
(b) the Addition Strategy in which one or more beliefs are added to a 
consistent set of beliefs to render the set more coherent. 
 
Regarding P1: Ceteris paribus, the more beliefs one has, the more likely they were 
generated in ways that make them false. But, for any particular set of beliefs, it is not 
obvious that the larger set must be less likely than the smaller set when all relevant 
information is considered.  
Regarding P2, Coherence involves logical consistency, but also the strength and 
number of inferential and explanatory connections between beliefs. Consider the 
importance of informativeness and explanatory success with the following Bayesian 
example about Tweety.  
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Bayesian	  formulation	  
Suppose there were three pieces of evidence about Tweety (see Olsson, 2012): 
A1 = “Tweety is a bird” 
A2 = “Tweety cannot fly” 
A3 = “Tweety is a penguin” 
E1 = “Jane reports that Tweety is a bird”  
E2 = “Carl reports that Tweety cannot fly” 
E3 = “Rick reports that Tweety is a Penguin” 
 
Using the principle of total evidence, the true probabilities are: 
S is P(A1,A2 | E1, E2)  
S’ is  P(A1,A2,A3 | E1, E2, E3). 
Smaller sets are more likely to be true than bigger sets. 
P(A1,A2 | E1, E2) >  P(A1,A2,A3 | E1, E2, E3). 
The intuitive idea is that “Tweety being a bird that cannot fly” is less cohesive than 
“Tweety being a penguin (hence bird) that cannot fly”. Yet, if KW are right, then the 
second more cohesive set are more likely to be false than the preceding set, so 
greater coherence leads to a greater likelihood of falsehood.  
 
But, the purpose of S and S’ is not to form a set of consistent true beliefs, but rather 
to determine what Tweety is. Tweety turns out to be a penguin, which means that the 
only belief necessary for the maximum coherence of the set, qua explanation, is E3. 
The fact that E1 and E2 exist and are logically consistent with E3 does not add much 
justification to E3. To demonstrate this, I use KW’s subtraction strategy P2 (a). 
Examining the set [E1, E2, E3], we should subtract E1 and E2, because they are 
entailed by E3. That is, the fact that Tweety is a penguin entails that Tweety cannot 
fly and that Tweety is a bird. We would only keep Ex in a set if it added explanatory 
information, e.g., suppose additional evidence E4 exists. 
E4 = “Sarah reports that Tweety is 60 million years old” 
Adding E4 may add information, but it does not affect the coherence of the existing 
beliefs because it does not change the credence of any of the beliefs.  
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However, if Tweety turns out to be a Waimanu penguin—an ancestral penguin that is 
classified as a bird and probably also capable of flight—then E2, (‘Tweety cannot fly’), 
may be explanatorily useless (though logically consistent), and therefore should be 
subtracted from the set. The normative value of coherence to the truth of a set of 
beliefs is more than logical consistency or even informativeness but explanation, 
more precisely, explanation relative to some goal. Adding a belief to a set raises the 
probability of another belief in the set when it plays the appropriate role.  
KW and Olsson’s excellent observation—that increasing beliefs in a set increases 
the odds that some of them are false—is a problem for fallible belief-producing 
processes generally, not a problem for coherence per se. I take the threat of 
increasing beliefs seriously enough to suggest in addition to reconsidering 
coherence, we must also redefine the justification of beliefs relative to limited sets, 
rather than beliefs considered holistically. 
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I consider a coherent set of beliefs to be a set that is satisfactorily held together for 
some epistemic goal. By removing implication, KW’s notion of coherence is 
equivalent to stacking a load of matching planks next to one another, eschewing 
fastenings, and complaining that there is no house. Of course no house exists—a 
house is built when planks are put together in an emergent way that produces an 
object greater than its parts. The relationships between beliefs are the nails, glue, 
and joinery that form greater knowledge. A cohering belief that makes a set of beliefs 
more likely to be true must add logical glue and relational fastenings—i.e. 
explanatory clarity. Sets of unrelated but consistent beliefs are not coherent, and 
they add danger (increase likely falsehood), without veritistic benefit. Ironically, KW 
hint that they understand this where they note that either adding or subtracting 
beliefs can bring more coherence. This suggests that KW appreciate that normative 
coherence represents more than logical consistency; instead, coherence reaches 
some maximal point for some set of beliefs for some goal—see Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Satisficing cohesion occurs when conditions meet a threshold for 
performance success.   
The	  value	  of	  distinctness	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The value of coherence lies in its role as part of a two-stage process of belief 
revision. Sometimes incoherence (between subsets of our beliefs) is necessary and 
it prompts us to ‘go back to square 1’, ‘reset’ thinks, or ‘shake things up.’ We reach a 
dead end, where we have achieved great coherence, but a not-so-great design. It is 
better at these points to disassemble the set into its constituent parts and 
reconceptualize what we want. Slavish devotion to coherence can leave us 
vulnerable to changing contexts. To use the analogy of the sabre tooth cat, the 
canines get longer and longer in order to target specific prey (goals), but if the prey 
become extinct (context change), the cat will become extinct too because they 
cannot adapt to the new circumstances. To be adaptive, coherence must be 
balanced with disintegration or distinction.  Distinctness is a source of justification 
when we can ascertain no necessary, causal, or explanatory connection between 
one set of beliefs and another. Distinctness occurs when a set of accurate beliefs 
(produced by reliable processes) is sufficient for a particular agent to perform 
successfully in a particular context. 
Coordination	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Coherence is a source of justification when it emerges from satisficing relations 
between choristic sets of beliefs (justified distinct from the rest of one’s beliefs). What 
then justifies the set up and dissolution of these sets? I argue that there is a need for 
a third kind of justification: coordination. A belief in any particular context is justified 
not just because it is reliably formed and coherent, but also because of how it is 
coordinated between local and holistic goals. Coordination means suppressing some 
beliefs and communicating other beliefs to ensure convergence on the right action for 
performance success. Better coordination means more efficient and effective 
progress. Importantly, an agent does not become more coordinated just through an 
increase of beliefs. It is the way the beliefs are managed and utilized that dictates its 
success. 
 
One of the advantages of limiting coherence to a partition of beliefs is that 
counterfactual reasoning and conjecture can take place distinct from other beliefs. If 
beliefs are coordinated dynamically, then justified partitions of beliefs can easily be 
taken offline, decoupled for intellectual hypothesis testing, or recoupled to sets of 
beliefs for empirical testing in the world—as occurs during exploratory, pretend, and 
imaginary play. Such an account may conflict with current theories of pretend or 
imaginary play that involve quarantining a silo of pretend beliefs from normal beliefs 
and this would be an interesting avenue of future (and possibly controversial) 
research. 
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Conclusion	  
 
In sum, our beliefs do not become more coherent simply because we have more of 
them. Instead there is an ideal level of coherence that must exist between any 
number of propositions for some goal in a particular context—confirmational chorism 
(Devitt, 2013). Coherence must be balanced with disintegration. Coherence and 
disintegration both act on the agent in turn, like the catabolic and anabolic forces 
within a cell. Ideally, then, the agent’s epistemic structures operate like 
homeostasis—self-regulating to maintain optimum health of the organism. If 
homeostasis is the “wisdom of the body” then epistemic homeostasis is the wisdom 
of the mind. 
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